Afghan police- the problem and the answer

(A local police official plans security for the upcoming national elections with the help of a Military Police Lieutenant.)

Nangarhar Province- It's hard to distinguish between what the Afghan police want and what they need. Yesterday they got bug spray and toilet paper, but the district chief outside Jalabad said he'd asked for soap and shampoo. And they always lack fuel and water. When the 4th-4 BSTB HHC Military Police who patrol three districts that encompass Jalabad south towards the Tora Bora mountains, ask any of the police to do a joint patrol the Afghans say they need fuel first, and they don't bring any water with them despite hundred plus temperatures. Their trucks are Ford Rangers, their boots are also U.S. issue, their pistols, their uniforms. "They're kind of takers," one Sergeant said.

"You know that saying, you teach a man to fish, well right now they're taking the fish."

Afghan Police do not have a good reputation. Part of it is the force did not actually exist before NATO forces began training them after 2001, and initially they did not receive anywhere near the support the Afghan Army gets because they weren't considered essential to capturing Al Qaida suspects. But with the resurgence of the Taliban in remote areas, community policing and investigations have started to make more and more sense as a way to secure the local population. The problem is they're still spread so thin the Taliban can have more authority in the rural areas that lack American presence. Whereas police stations in Jalabad seem to get a lot of support, training and even new facilities, police outposts in the more remote, insurgent-infested districts don't even have enough fuel to keep the lights on at night.

"Two years ago we only had two trucks, not much training," a Jalabad district chief said. "Now we have four trucks, more weapons and better food." Still the chief only has 24 men to cover a population area of some a hundred thousand people. Which makes coverage pretty much impossible.
(c) Simon Klingert

At Outpost Spur on the border of the volatile southern Khogyani district, their generators haven't worked for six days, they didn't have any water and their septic system had overflown. The men met in darkness with Lt. John Holland who's squad often spends the night outdoors with the Afghans to show their support.
(c) Simon Klingert (Lt. Holland and his MPs meet with police at Outpost Spur.)

He's formed a relationship and trusts these men when they say they've patrolled an area. "I see motivation. They'll volunteer five guys when I ask for four. I know in some areas when they say they go out, in more dangerous areas, I'm not quite sure. I've seen their trucks get blown up. But if I say I'm going to a place they'll always go," Lt. Holland said.

(Lt. Holland's patrol come across some Afghan farmers in the fields. Local police have told farmers to carry lights to signify that they aren't Taliban.)

The ANP are getting significantly better training than a few years ago, with the help of embedded contractors for advisers and a specialized two-month training program, and they are eager to impress their American counterparts on joint patrols, but it's difficult to tell how well the standard police force would do when left to their own devices.

(c) Simon Klingert (Afghan police sit in on an MP-run checkpoint training at their district station.)

They offer up all sorts of information, from locals who've found IEDs to the latest intel. on rocket attacks and vehicle-borne bombings, but most of it is information the MP's already know. Still reporting on IED's is increasing. Lt. Holland said the rate of the local population reporting IEDs to IED's going off is now 50/50. There's now a hotline number for people to call in to the police on suspicious activity.

The MPs from the 4-4th BSTB Headquarters have the latest in armor and equipment, but they too struggle with coverage. "75 percent of our area, I've never been to before," Lt. Holland said, "It's huge. Coverage and terrain are the biggest issues. The road system here is just being built."

(c) Simon Klingert (The Afghan Police living quarters at the Beshud station outside Jalabad.)

"We're focused on learning the area first, now the elections. Then we'll really get into what's secure and what's not secure," Lt. Holland said.

"I think we need to concentrate on the kids," said First Seargent Goolie. "It's an easy way to gauge if U.S. forces have been in the area. If the kids run up to you, they're used to us." In the remote areas of Khogyani and Chapahar, children often shy away.
(c) Simon Klingert (SSgt. Briggs of the 4-4th BSTB MP's directs his men on a support mission to assist the Afghan Police in tracking down reports of armed men blocking a road.)

The day of the checkpoint training a call came in to the police station about some armed men setting up an illegal checkpoint. The Afghans jumped into their Ford Rangers and were there in minutes. "That's often what you don't see from the ANP," said embedded reporter, Simon Klingert, who's spent significant time patrolling with Afghans, "either they won't get the call from the locals, or they won't be motivated."

The MP's also responded with back up. The call came from a wealthy village that police said had made previous threats against their police chief. It may have proved a good pretext for them to go investigate, an inordinate amount of police showed up to question what looked like construction workers, but at the least they were there.