Wild West of Wardak

Jagahtu, Wardak- If the process of getting here is any indication, Combat Outpost Jagahtu is a difficult place.

(Photo: Spc. Kontour and Sgt. Lazaridi do their best early morning shaves.  They don't have access to showers or running water yet.)

I waited three days at Bagram to get to Forward Operating Base Shank, and then three days at Shank to get to Jagahtu, since no civlian flights will go there. Jagahtu is a barely two month old outpost in the far West corner of Wardak Province.

 

And the looks the Massachusetts Guardsmen gave me as we were waiting for the helicopter. Why would you go there? they asked. We helped build that place, they said. We got rocketed every day out of the month except for three.  I listened of course, but exaggeration in the war zone is as common as a nicotine habit. I had to see for myself.

But I did notice when I finally got on the helicopter, the only other people going to Jagahtu were the Intel guys wearing beards and no unit patches, two soldiers from Able Company and two mental health specialists. Something bad had happened a few days before.

An IED had obliterated an Afghan Army truck, killing five Afghans and touching off an hour long fire fight with soldiers from 2nd Platoon who had been following the truck through the bazaar. Able Company soldiers fired machine guns from the base’s guard towers and launched missiles and mortars down into the village that had been emptied by a hardened Taliban force come into the district to attack. Soldiers reported muzzle flashes firing from dozens of village Qulats (compounds).

It was a terrible loss for the Afghan forces at Jagahtu. Their lieutenant, known for being harder working and more competent than other Afghan forces Able had previously worked with, had been killed instantly. Body parts flung dozens of meters while Talib fighters stood and shot face to face with U.S. firepower. But it may have been a desperate attempt at trying to force the Americans and Afghans to leave Jagahtu.

People held in Fear

Jagahtu is a poor agricultural district of approximately 22,000 in Wardak province, that had never seen an American force presence for more than 96 hours, according to Capt. Alex Haig of 1st Battalion 503rd Infantry. Haig who was on his 57th day of living at Jagahtu when I talked to him, has seen 39 separate Taliban 107 rocket and/or 82 millimeter mortar attacks. They call it indirect fire, but because of Taliban freedom of movement and target reference points in the area, it was anything but indirect.

“I came on April 28th,” Captain Haig said. “Part of the reason for Jagahtu is the surge (of U.S. forces), part is to expand the Governemnt of Afghanistan and U.S. forces to an area that hasn’t been touched.”

The initial U.S. force of 1st Battalion 503rd Infantry, Army engineers and contractors, a total of 150 men was hit by indirect fire 32 of their first 35 days while they tried to build up barriers and basic necessities, before Able Company arrived. Intelligence sources gathered that a Taliban named Mullah Ghaus commanded 35-40 local fighters, probably supported by counterparts in Pakistan, and had support of the local elders.  In fact there seemed to be little separation between the Taliban and local authority figures, according to some reports.  But there is always the coercion of fear when there is no other governmental authority or police force.

Their control of the area has been such that the Taliban can cut cell phone service at 18:00 everyday, probably so the U.S. can’t monitor them. Capt. Haig reported every time the base was hit by rockets or mortars, they had no cell phone reception immediately prior.

From distances of 9 kilometers away, the Jagahtu Taliban could pull up in a vehicle and set up a rocket launcher already dialed into the base’s coordinates. Tragically on May 6th Specialist Slack was killed by rocket shrapnel just outside the pock-marked command center. Two U.S. soldiers have also been injured by shrapnel and four Afghan civilians wounded when the Talib rockets hit the local bazaar.

U.S. forces treated the two wounded children and paid for repairs to the bazaar. Capt. Haig reported that locals reacted angrily to these attacks and may be the beginning of a rift between the Talibs and elders that Able Company will be able to exploit once they get a respected elder in the vacant seat of the district sub-governor.

“I don’t know what the Jagahtu Taliban is thinking…” Capt. Haig said. “Initially they thought that we’d pack up. Now they realize we aren’t leaving… They might as well work with us.”

The previous sub-governor was known for being weak, Capt. Haig said. Negotiations have empowered the elders to hand select a new sub-governor to occupy the district center building inside base. “That’s all we’ve been waiting for. The Taliban won’t attack when the elders are here,” Capt. Haig said. “They’re essentially one and the same.” Which is why it’s important to have the right elder to bring the other elders on to the base.

“This is an area where the judicial system is Taliban. They are well respected. Instead of alienating the Taliban as specters in the night, we might as well to bring them to the table for reconciliation (with the government of Afghanistan),” Haig said.

But so far no powerful elder has agreed to become sub-governor, either out of fear or mixed allegiances.

Why Able?

Able Company had already slogged half a deployment in Kunar, not a safe or easy place by any indicator. “We wondered why they sent us down here…” Lt. Richard Hill of 2nd Platoon said, “They are several theories.”

(Photo: Soldiers of 2nd Platoon wait in the "hesco hallway" for the all clear.  They'd been getting rocketed almost daily.)

Whatever it is, Able is run by experienced non-commissioned officers who have fought scores of gunfights in the narrow valleys of the Kunar, and were now being sent to an outpost that was less than two months old and dropped into an elevated plane that was essentially controlled by the Taliban.

The 1st Battalion Command at FOB Shank said Jagahtu is the hottest place in their area of operations right now, mainly because of the consistent indirect fire. “It was free reign for our adversaries,” Lt. Col. Gillerian said. A presence was needed.

Out in the Community

The roads, such that they are too dangerous from IEDs, so to reach Sfingin Village, 2nd Platoon dune buggied their MATV’s (specialized MRAP vehicles) off road behind a group of Afghan forces. In the sparse village dotted with walled compounds, they handed out radios in the hope to communicate with villagers through a coalition radio station that would establish some sense of an Afghan Government presence. The problem is some of the villages are afraid to take the radios, and had told other platoons the Taliban would take them and then punish those who had them.

Several young men, two of them teachers, described how the Taliban sweeps into their village and searches people for signs of working with the Americans or the government. “One or two Taliban come in on motorcycle. They threaten with weapons. When you (U.S.) leave, they’ll come and beat us.”

Lt. Richard Hill asked where the Taliban came from. “They come from over the hill...” When asked to be more specific, “Some from next door, some from Pakistan,” the men said, who seemed more honest, but probably more fearful of Taliban presence than in Kunar.

“We can pay money for information,” Lt. Hill told the young men. “Make sure everyone knows that.”

It didn’t seem to matter. The teacher said the Taliban often check the villager’s phone directories, calling all the listed numbers. If someone were to answer in English or sound like they were from the “government”, it wouldn’t be good for the phone’s owner.

(photo: Spc. Gossman and Spc. Chisenhall of Third Platoon interact with curious young madrassa students.)

Lt. John Miller’s 3rd Platoon Able Co. had a similar experience in a village closer to the base. At a local Madrassa, kids surrounded the soldiers with playful curiosity. Lt. Miller asked if the local mullahs would be willing to come to the base for a discussion. The bearded men replied, first the district needed good security. In other words, they wouldn’t come voluntarily.

“This place hasn’t seen coalition forces. So as far as us initially coming in, the people are very cautious. Half won’t give us cell phone numbers. The elders are afraid of talking to us in front of the teens. On the ICom (radio) chatter they’re calling our vehicles tanks,” said Spc. Nicholas Chisenhall of 3rd Platoon.

“Now there’s talk of giving us a chance. The firefights have gone down as we have made contact with the villagers, and have shot back at attackers and they know we’re here to stay… I think by the time we leave, things will start calming down. Once they realize we can provide things for them,” Chisenhall said.

“We’re in the shaping and security phase, versus the building government phase, we were doing in Kunar,” Lt. Ida Miller of 1st Platoon, Able Co. said. “You have to map the structure to understand if the Taliban is the actual leadership structure or just an influencer. Before we came, the Marines and Special Forces would come to the area to take out bad guys and then leave. The Afghan Army hasn’t gotten along well with locals. We’re not going to change the perceptions in two weeks. I didn’t hand out radios. They say the Taliban will take them and beat whoever had them.”

Progress seems possible

Working in Jagahtu is like Counter-Insurgency from scratch, Capt. Haig suggested. If it starts to work, a sub-governor will soon occupy the rocket scarred district center in between the Afghan Police and Army barracks. And Able Company will only have to walk to the office and barracks to coordinate with all these three arms of the district government for security and later project funding.

But it will be an uphill battle to get some of the elders to commit to the coalition. Capt. Haig arrived with $25,000 in project money, but hadn’t shelled hardly any of it out. The people have been too terrorized to even take the free American money, a restraint almost unheard of in other provinces.

Hoping to drive a wedge between the local Taliban and more hardened Taliban who came from the north to launch the coordinated attack weeks ago, Able Co. is holding meetings with representatives of the local Taliban. The best outcome is local Taliban will reconcile and become part of the government. Attacks on the base will reduce significantly. If it works, it will be step one.  And it will take time.