Zahri District, Kandahar- Embedded reporters sometimes get a battlefield brief by the battalion just before they shuttle from the FOBs (forward bases) out to the outposts where the war actually is. These briefs, which consist of a power point presentation by some very sincere officers, vary in usefulness. Sometimes they feel like a bunch of propaganda, other times you can glean some useful facts. Usually it's a mix of impossible optimism of how the unit can turn around a very bad place and some good background info.
The brief was on Zahri District, Kandahar, an area where Mullah Omar first began preaching "Talibanism" in a nearby mosque, an area divided by a thick green band of grape vines and vegetation that the Russians called "the heart of darkness" or "green death" for reasons that they would get shot at real bad when they ventured in. 1st Battalion of 502nd Infantry of the Black Hearts 2-101st came in here as part of a full brigade surge just a few months ago, and have had a very tough fight. Sometimes not making it a 100 meters outside the outpost before getting hit by Taliban shooters. Several platoon's posted near the city of Sanjeray have taken heavy shrapnel injuries from the Taliban practice of throwing grenades over compound walls when they patrol by.
The brief revealed how the battalion is using specialized electronic surveillance to keep their eyes on Taliban fighters. I wouldn't want to report to the details, as operational security rules could get me pulled from reporting out here, but the officers made clear how they are 'waiting and tracking to kill the enemy with the best effect'. They reported they've caused no civilian deaths in several months of very kinetic fighting. They measure this by the fact that no elders have asked for compensation for deaths.
Even Afghans associated with the enemy will press the coaltion for monetary compensation if they feel its owed to them. One company commander mentioned one of the only effective ways of gathering elders is by making some arrests in the area. The elders then come to complain, and the commander said he's fired back on how his soldiers have been sacrificing blood for them.
But if the lowering of civilian casualties were true, this would be a major accomplishment and a sign that using technology and knowing the Taliban's patterns is yielding more accurate and valuable air strikes. It is also the minimum pre-requisite towards establishing some relationship with the local populace.
To this effect, we observed one Platoon Leader telling locals that they had just taken out two armed Taliban a few days before in some kind of missile strike. Those who were showing their faces to the U.S. in Sanjeray this morning seemed to show modest approval for this lethality. This kind of information operation was intended to show that the Coalition is conducting careful targeting and taking out Taliban who shoot and throw grenades indiscriminately, "around your children".(photo: Lt. Kinzel of 1st Plt. Alpha Co. 1-502 Infantry looks through a hole atop the Afghan police station after taking some fire from the surrounding vegetation to the south.)
Unfortunately, the locals may be too scared to show much approval. Zahri is Taliban infested and it will be a very long fight down here, even if the U.S. kills enough hardcore insurgents to stand up some projects like the Pier Mohammed school and an agricultural center that the Battalion hopes will allow their locals to sell grapes more locally rather than taking them all the way to Pakistan.
Coincidentally this week's NYT's story announced a move to more targeted killing approach as part of Gen. Petraeus's counter-insurgency with teeth. Is this tactical shift reflected in one Afghanistan's most dangerous areas?
As my friend and long-time embedded reporter, Simon Klingert pointed out in response to this question: "Targeted killings have been carried out in Afghanistan by ODA (Special Forces) and other specialized units since 2001. It was not until 2008/ 2009 that ISAF shifted the focus from an enemy- centric towards a population- centric approach, but this doesn't mean that irreconcilable elements have not/ are not taken out deliberately within the broader context of COIN. As a matter of fact, under Gen. McChrystal the number of ODAs in country actively hunting insurgents more than doubled.
But anyone who knows Gen. Petraeus' academic works, including FM 3-24, is aware that the overriding imperative of his newly released COIN guidance is the protection of the population and the creation of host nation security forces, and not a shift back towards an enemy- centric approach. In Areas of Operation (AOs) where the population is receptive towards the Coalition this might work out, while other AOs will continue to feature high levels of violence and operations will consequently include the deliberate removal of High Value Targets."
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