One day at Outpost Michigan, Pech Valley

COP Michigan-

The shooting started around mid-morning at Michigan, a small base crouched between a series of opposing ridge lines and the muddy brown of the Pech River.  Outpost Michigan is built like a maze of sand filled walls and overhanging roofs to provide added protection from incoming fire.

(Photo: 155 Artillery fired by 3-321st FAR out of  Camp Blessing, often to help fend off attacks on COP Michigan, 25 minutes down the Pech Valley.)

Already mortars were blowing up the mountainside opposite Pride Rock (the US/Afghan outpost on a cliff above) and machine gun fire letting loose in fast bursts.  It was hard to tell from where, only that it was mostly U.S.  Every few  minutes, louder machine gun bursts came from the towers that stood on the outer ends of Michigan, which isn't very far.  Insurgent bullets whizzed overhead, but far overhead, I thought.  Several Dshka  (Russian machine gun) rounds went through a soldiers sleeping hut and apparent stopped in an empty bed.  Lt. Farazdaghi was holding the rifled copper round in the command center. Every soldier from 1-327th Infantry at Michigan has a story like this.

After maybe an hour, heavy artillery flung from Camp Blessing, 25 minutes down the Pech River road, started rumbling in on the mountains.  Shortly after, the first bomb of the day dropped.  There's nothing like a 500 pound bomb to show you the power that can be contained in a steel canister and dropped from an F-15 jet.  Also, the near suicidal bravery of the Taliban to start shooting again after the bomb.

Inside the (TOC) where all the communications and cameras are controlled, there was a kind of chaotic energy, some with a radio to either ear while typing on a key board.  In no particular order, I observed a camera capturing a local kid trying to take some rocks off the wall and getting knocked off by a non-lethal claymore mine.  A donkey reportedly killed and an elder in Kanday who wanted to come to the base to talk about it.

(Photo: Spc. Todd Oliveira of Westport MA, looks out a Michigan tower onto the Pech River.)

Then the first reports came in that a U.S. convoy coming to Michigan had been hit about four kilometers away, and one of the lead vehicles was in flames by Bar Kanday, a known ambush spot at the intersection of valleys.  They radioed that they were taking heavy fire.  Artillery was called in on the hills surrounding their position.  A team of soldiers was spun up from Michigan to go out and assist the downed convoy, and another unit was put on ready in case the first quick reaction force got into trouble.  I asked Capt. Dakota Steedsman how many times his Company had been ambushed there.  He shook his head.  He couldn't tell me.

We watched the F-15 feed go white as another 2000 pound bomb dropped.

"0-60 in two days," First Sgt. Ehlshide said.  It had been quiet for three days one soldier told me, the longest he could remember.  Of course Delta Co. had just killed 19 Taliban in Omar, a reportedly "bad village" at the mouth of the Korengal earlier that week.  First- 327thBattalion commander Lt. Col. Joseph Ryan confirmed they are still conducting operations in the Korengal, where U.S. forces pulled out in May, as it is still part of their area of operation.  "I told the elders in Omar, I can get back there and reach the Taliban if I have to," Capt. Steedsman said. 

A half hour later, the downed convoy was still taking fire as rounds cooked off in the burning vehicle.  All while waiting on a Kiowa helicopter to come in and strafe enemy hill positions.  "The birds are five minutes out," we heard on the radio.  Soldiers tried to mark where they're taking fire by launching smoke grenades.

The cameras spot a body being pulled on a liter, a suspected attacker.  Another guy was reportedly detained."The Pech River boy scouts are out today," someone quipped.

Soldiers on quick reaction were told to move up to get a look at the fighting positions they were attacked from.  Finally, the downed convoy makes it back to Michigan, leaving the flaming wreck to be towed by another group.

It is not yet 2 p.m.  I ask Capt. Steedsman how this day compares to any other at Michigan.  "This is probably a medium to low day.  If we take recoiless (rifle) or mortars to the COP we bump it up to high.  We only took some small arms."

Soldiers' perspective- "The COP would get hit so hard you'd feel safer on patrol" 
Soldiers were heartened by the assault mission into Omar, where from the top of Pride Rock, they've seen men shooting heavy weapons at them and scampering away. "When we first got here, they were giving it to us.  That Omar mission was the first time we went on the offensive," PFC David Sloniker, 25 said.  At least six soldiers have been wounded in action in his platoon.  Out of Michigan, three soldiers have been killed. "(The last few months) the COP would get hit so hard, you'd feel safer on patrol."

Still they've been here too long to believe that one mission will quiet these mountain fighters for longer than a week or two. "They totally know our Rules of Engagement," PFC Slonicker said, describing how the Taliban will shoot from houses because they know U.S. soldiers can't shoot back at them, also from the bazaar across the river. (See NYT's At War Blog on Rules of Engagement at Michigan.)

An enemy so brazen as to "pace" the outpost looking for weaknesses, and from the guard towers looking out, no one knows who looks idle and who's scouting for the Taliban.  There are strong suspicions though. "We'll be in key leader engagements in the bazaar, about to get some good information and some other guy will come over and change the subject," Oliveira said.  The inference is the Taliban is everywhere here and the fear vibrates throughout the population.

But they don't underestimate them. "You gotta respect them," Oliveira said. "They're fighters fighting for a long time.... They'll maneuver on us.  In Iraq it was just guys with AKs shooting and running."

And in the back of their minds, many soldiers know that after this deployment U.S. forces might pull out of the Pech altogether.  Some analysts have said the bases are too small and ineffective.  Another way to put it is the Pech population is not a Key Terrain District, a term Lt. Col. Ryan said is being tossed around as part of an ongoing assessment by Regional Command East of which areas carry the population and commerce centers of gravity that U.S. forces should concentrate on influencing after this critical surge year ends.

In other words a change may be coming as soon as the new strategy is determined, and an infantry battalion such as his successor's may be deemed to have more tactical value in a place that's less resistant and has more of an influx of people.  The Pech Valley road dead ends before the volatile Chapadara district in the West.  All efforts to build coalition-funded roads into Chapadara, Nuristan and the Korengal from the Pech road have met with violent a resistance and too few Afghan influence makers stepping up to help, to be worth the costs.

"As a commander in the Pech River Valley, key terrain districts does nothing for me," Lt. Col. Ryan said, "because I don't have any..."You can make an argument not to be here based on the effects you want to achieve," he said, side stepping the question of whether he would recommend the U.S. leaving the Pech.  That's up to the Generals, he said.

Soldiers feel the frustration on the ground. "You can tell the majority of people like us here," Spc. Brian Tabada said, "but the Taliban has fear as a motivation tool, and we have talking.... We need something to show we're serious."